modelcontextprotocol · fredericbarthelet · Jun 30, 2026 · Jul 1, 2026 · Jul 1, 2026 · Jul 1, 2026
diff --git a/docs/migrate_from_openai_apps.md b/docs/migrate_from_openai_apps.md
@@ -53,13 +53,13 @@ The server-side changes involve updating metadata structure and using helper fun
 
 ### CSP Field Mapping
 
-| OpenAI             | MCP Apps          | Notes                                                      |
-| ------------------ | ----------------- | ---------------------------------------------------------- |
-| `resource_domains` | `resourceDomains` | Origins for static assets (images, fonts, styles, scripts) |
-| `connect_domains`  | `connectDomains`  | Origins for fetch/XHR/WebSocket requests                   |
-| `frame_domains`    | `frameDomains`    | Origins for nested iframes                                 |
-| `redirect_domains` | —                 | OpenAI-only: origins for `openExternal` redirects          |
-| —                  | `baseUriDomains`  | MCP-only: `base-uri` CSP directive                         |
+| OpenAI             | MCP Apps                      | Notes                                                                                                                                     |
+| ------------------ | ----------------------------- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
+| `resource_domains` | `resourceDomains`             | Origins for static assets (images, fonts, styles, scripts)                                                                                |
+| `connect_domains`  | `connectDomains`              | Origins for fetch/XHR/WebSocket requests                                                                                                  |
+| `frame_domains`    | `frameDomains`                | Origins for nested iframes                                                                                                                |
+| `redirect_domains` | `_meta.ui.linkTrustedDomains` | Origins `ui/open-link` may skip confirmation for. Note: this lives on `_meta.ui`, a sibling of `_meta.ui.csp`, not inside the CSP object. |
+| —                  | `baseUriDomains`              | MCP-only: `base-uri` CSP directive                                                                                                        |
 
 ### Server-Side Migration Example
 
@@ -255,9 +255,10 @@ Client-side migration involves replacing the implicit `window.openai` global wit
 
 ### External Links
 
-| OpenAI                                       | MCP Apps                            | Notes                                |
-| -------------------------------------------- | ----------------------------------- | ------------------------------------ |
-| `await window.openai.openExternal({ href })` | `await app.openLink({ url: href })` | Different param name: `href` → `url` |
+| OpenAI                                       | MCP Apps                            | Notes                                                                        |
+| -------------------------------------------- | ----------------------------------- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
+| `await window.openai.openExternal({ href })` | `await app.openLink({ url: href })` | Different param name: `href` → `url`                                         |
+| `_meta["openai/widgetCSP"].redirect_domains` | `_meta.ui.linkTrustedDomains`       | Origins that skip the host's link confirmation. Declared on the UI resource. |
 
 ### Display Mode
 

diff --git a/examples/basic-host/package.json b/examples/basic-host/package.json
@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@
   },
   "devDependencies": {
     "@types/express": "^5.0.0",
-    "@types/node": "22.10.0",
+    "@types/node": "24.13.2",
     "@types/react": "^19.2.2",
     "@types/react-dom": "^19.2.2",
     "@vitejs/plugin-react": "^4.3.4",

diff --git a/examples/basic-host/src/implementation.ts b/examples/basic-host/src/implementation.ts
@@ -72,6 +72,7 @@ interface UiResourceData {
   html: string;
   csp?: McpUiResourceCsp;
   permissions?: McpUiResourcePermissions;
+  linkTrustedDomains?: string[];
 }
 
 export interface ToolCallInfo {
@@ -151,8 +152,9 @@ async function getUiResource(serverInfo: ServerInfo, uri: string): Promise<UiRes
   const uiMeta = contentMeta?.ui ?? listingMeta?.ui;
   const csp = uiMeta?.csp;
   const permissions = uiMeta?.permissions;
+  const linkTrustedDomains = uiMeta?.linkTrustedDomains;
 
-  return { html, csp, permissions };
+  return { html, csp, permissions, linkTrustedDomains };
 }
 
 
@@ -271,6 +273,7 @@ export interface AppBridgeCallbacks {
 export interface AppBridgeOptions {
   containerDimensions?: { maxHeight?: number; width?: number } | { height: number; width?: number };
   displayMode?: "inline" | "fullscreen";
+  linkTrustedDomains?: string[];
 }
 
 export function newAppBridge(
@@ -340,8 +343,24 @@ export function newAppBridge(
 
   appBridge.onopenlink = async (params, _extra) => {
     log.info("Open link request:", params);
-    window.open(params.url, "_blank", "noopener,noreferrer");
-    return {};
+
+    const HOST_OPENLINK_DENYLIST = [new URL("https://malicious.com")];
+    if (HOST_OPENLINK_DENYLIST.some(({ origin }) => origin === new URL(params.url).origin)) {
+      log.info("Blocked link by host denylist:", params.url);
+      return { isError: true };
+    }
+
+    const isTrustedByApp = options?.linkTrustedDomains?.some((trustedDomain) =>
+      new URLPattern(trustedDomain).test(params.url)
+    );
+    const shouldOpen = isTrustedByApp || window.confirm(`Open external link?\n${params.url}`);
+    if (shouldOpen) {
+      window.open(params.url, "_blank", "noopener,noreferrer");
+      return {};
+    }
+
+    log.info("User declined to open link:", params.url);
+    return { isError: true };
   };
 
   appBridge.onloggingmessage = (params) => {

diff --git a/examples/basic-host/src/index.tsx b/examples/basic-host/src/index.tsx
@@ -434,7 +434,7 @@ function AppIFramePanel({ toolCallInfo, isDestroying, onTeardownComplete }: AppI
 
     // First get CSP and permissions from resource, then load sandbox
     // CSP is set via HTTP headers (tamper-proof), permissions via iframe allow attribute
-    toolCallInfo.appResourcePromise.then(({ csp, permissions }) => {
+    toolCallInfo.appResourcePromise.then(({ csp, permissions, linkTrustedDomains }) => {
       loadSandboxProxy(iframe, csp, permissions).then((firstTime) => {
         // The `firstTime` check guards against React Strict Mode's double
         // invocation (mount → unmount → remount simulation in development).
@@ -449,6 +449,7 @@ function AppIFramePanel({ toolCallInfo, isDestroying, onTeardownComplete }: AppI
             // Provide container dimensions - maxHeight for flexible sizing
             containerDimensions: { maxHeight: 6000 },
             displayMode: "inline",
+            linkTrustedDomains,
           });
           appBridgeRef.current = appBridge;
           initializeApp(iframe, appBridge, toolCallInfo);

diff --git a/package-lock.json b/package-lock.json
diff --git a/package.json b/package.json
@@ -124,8 +124,7 @@
   "overrides": {
     "seroval": "1.4.1",
     "seroval-plugins": "1.4.2",
-    "solid-js": "1.9.10",
-    "@types/node": "20.19.27"
+    "solid-js": "1.9.10"
   },
   "dependencies": {
     "@standard-schema/spec": "^1.1.0"

diff --git a/specification/draft/apps.mdx b/specification/draft/apps.mdx
@@ -225,6 +225,26 @@ interface UIResourceMeta {
    * - omitted: host decides border
    */
   prefersBorder?: boolean,
+  /**
+   * Origins the view is expecting to open via `ui/open-link`
+   *
+   * Servers declare external destinations the view legitimately links to (for
+   * example its own marketing site). Hosts MAY use this list to skip the link
+   * confirmation prompt for matching destinations.
+   *
+   * - Each entry is an origin (scheme + host[:port]); a leading `*.` is a
+   *   subdomain wildcard, matching the rules used for `csp` domain fields.
+   * - Empty or omitted = every `ui/open-link` is subject to the host's
+   *   default policy (typically a confirmation prompt).
+   *
+   * This is a UX hint, NOT an authorization mechanism. Hosts retain full
+   * authority, MUST still apply their own allowlist/blocklist, and SHOULD NOT
+   * treat a declared origin as proof that a destination is safe.
+   *
+   * @example
+   * ["https://example.com", "https://*.example.com"]
+   */
+  linkTrustedDomains?: string[],
 }
 ```
 
@@ -254,6 +274,7 @@ The resource content is returned via `resources/read`:
         };
         domain?: string;
         prefersBorder?: boolean;
+        linkTrustedDomains?: string[]; // Origins ui/open-link may skip confirmation for.
       };
     };
   }];
@@ -262,7 +283,7 @@ The resource content is returned via `resources/read`:
 
 #### Metadata Location
 
-`UIResourceMeta` (CSP, permissions, domain, prefersBorder) may be provided on either or both:
+`UIResourceMeta` (CSP, permissions, domain, prefersBorder, linkTrustedDomains) may be provided on either or both:
 
 - **`resources/list`:** On the resource entry's `_meta.ui` field. Useful as a static default that hosts can review at connection time.
 - **`resources/read`:** On each content item's `_meta.ui` field. Useful for per-response overrides or dynamic metadata that is only known at read time.
@@ -1039,6 +1060,23 @@ MCP Apps introduces additional JSON-RPC methods for UI-specific functionality:
 
 Host SHOULD open the URL in the user's default browser or a new tab.
 
+By default, hosts SHOULD guard `ui/open-link` against unexpected navigation —
+for example by showing a confirmation prompt — since the URL originates from
+sandboxed UI content.
+
+**Trusted destinations (`linkTrustedDomains`).** A server MAY declare origins it
+legitimately links to via the resource's `_meta.ui.linkTrustedDomains` (see
+[UI Resource Format](#ui-resource-format)). For a `ui/open-link` whose URL
+matches one of those origins, the host MAY **skip the confirmation prompt** and
+open the link directly.
+
+Matching uses the same origin rules as `csp` domain fields: an entry is an
+origin (scheme + host[:port]) and a leading `*.` is a subdomain wildcard.
+
+> **Security:** `linkTrustedDomains` is a UX hint, not an authorization
+> mechanism. Because the value comes from the (untrusted) server, hosts MUST
+> still enforce their own allowlist/blocklist and MAY confirm regardless.
+
 `ui/download-file` - Request host to download a file
 
 ```typescript

diff --git a/src/app-bridge.examples.ts b/src/app-bridge.examples.ts
@@ -159,6 +159,12 @@ declare const chatManager: {
 // Stub for example code - represents a hypothetical URL validator
 declare function isAllowedDomain(url: string): boolean;
 
+// Stub for example code - represents the URL Pattern tester
+declare function matchesLinkTrustedDomains(
+  url: string,
+  linkTrustedDomains: string[] | undefined,
+): boolean;
+
 // Stub for example code - represents a hypothetical dialog API
 declare function showDialog(options: {
   message: string;
@@ -173,14 +179,25 @@ declare const modelContextManager: {
 /**
  * Example: Handle external link requests from the View.
  */
-function AppBridge_onopenlink_handleRequest(bridge: AppBridge) {
+function AppBridge_onopenlink_handleRequest(
+  bridge: AppBridge,
+  // Origins declared by the resource via `_meta.ui.linkTrustedDomains`.
+  linkTrustedDomains: string[] | undefined,
+) {
   //#region AppBridge_onopenlink_handleRequest
   bridge.onopenlink = async ({ url }, extra) => {
+    // The host's own policy always wins, regardless of server-declared trust.
     if (!isAllowedDomain(url)) {
       console.warn("Blocked external link:", url);
       return { isError: true };
     }
 
+    // Destinations the server declared as trusted skip the confirmation prompt.
+    if (matchesLinkTrustedDomains(url, linkTrustedDomains)) {
+      window.open(url, "_blank", "noopener,noreferrer");
+      return {};
+    }
+
     const confirmed = await showDialog({
       message: `Open external link?\n${url}`,
       buttons: ["Open", "Cancel"],

diff --git a/src/app-bridge.ts b/src/app-bridge.ts
@@ -670,6 +670,7 @@ export class AppBridge extends ProtocolWithEvents<
    *
    * The host MAY:
    * - Show a confirmation dialog before opening
+   * - Consider skipping user confirmation
    * - Block URLs based on a security policy or allowlist
    * - Log the request for audit purposes
    * - Reject the request entirely
@@ -682,11 +683,18 @@ export class AppBridge extends ProtocolWithEvents<
    * @example
    * ```ts source="./app-bridge.examples.ts#AppBridge_onopenlink_handleRequest"
    * bridge.onopenlink = async ({ url }, extra) => {
+   *   // The host's own policy always wins, regardless of server-declared trust.
    *   if (!isAllowedDomain(url)) {
    *     console.warn("Blocked external link:", url);
    *     return { isError: true };
    *   }
    *
+   *   // Destinations the server declared as trusted skip the confirmation prompt.
+   *   if (matchesLinkTrustedDomains(url, linkTrustedDomains)) {
+   *     window.open(url, "_blank", "noopener,noreferrer");
+   *     return {};
+   *   }
+   *
    *   const confirmed = await showDialog({
    *     message: `Open external link?\n${url}`,
    *     buttons: ["Open", "Cancel"],

diff --git a/src/generated/schema.json b/src/generated/schema.json
diff --git a/src/generated/schema.ts b/src/generated/schema.ts
diff --git a/src/spec.types.ts b/src/spec.types.ts
@@ -728,6 +728,35 @@ export interface McpUiResourceMeta {
    * - omitted: host decides border
    */
   prefersBorder?: boolean;
+  /**
+   * @description Origins the view is expecting to open via `ui/open-link`.
+   *
+   * Servers declare external destinations the view legitimately links to (for
+   * example its own marketing site). Hosts MAY use this list to **skip the link
+   * confirmation prompt** for matching destinations, instead of confirming every
+   * `ui/open-link`.
+   *
+   * Matching follows the same origin rules as {@link McpUiResourceCsp} fields:
+   * an entry is an origin (scheme + host[:port]) and wildcard subdomains are
+   * supported (e.g. `https://*.example.com`).
+   *
+   * > [!IMPORTANT]
+   * > This is a **UX hint, not an authorization mechanism.** It only relaxes
+   * > confirmation for the declared origins; it does not grant the view any
+   * > capability. Hosts retain full authority and MUST still apply their own
+   * > global allowlist/blocklist and MAY confirm regardless. Because the value
+   * > comes from the server, hosts SHOULD NOT treat it as proof that a
+   * > destination is safe.
+   *
+   * - Empty or omitted → every `ui/open-link` is subject to the host's default
+   *   policy (typically a confirmation prompt).
+   *
+   * @example
+   * ```ts
+   * ["https://example.com", "https://*.example.com"]
+   * ```
+   */
+  linkTrustedDomains?: string[];
 }
 
 /**